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Husserl never understood why his championing of a
phenomenological “transcendental idealism” caused such strong
objections and, at its most extreme, resentments. He considered the
dispute between idealism and realism, which ignited over the
publication of his Ideas I, «sterile (unfruchtbar)» and «unphilosophical»
(HUSSERL 1930, 563)1. And yet, it seems that the reception of Husserl’s
work goes through regular cycles of this very dispute. We are therefore
left with the question: why does it seem impossible to setle this issue?
One answer lies in the very nature of Husserl’s thought. On the one
hand, Husserl’s ambitions paraleled those of Kant who, as
Mendelssohn famously claimed, was a «total crusher (der
Aleszermalmer)», refuting rational psychology, philosophical
cosmology, and rational theology in one fel swoop (and, in fact, in one
book). On the other hand, Husserl proceeded more like a “total
synthesizer”, continuously incorporating already available ideas and
frameworks (historical or contemporary) and “turning” them into
moments of his phenomenology. This eclecticism, however, was not
arbitrary. Husserl seems to have genuinely believed that the greatest
minds of the past and present tended to get it right in certain respects,
but that their notions (mostly because of deeply entrenched prejudices
that obscured their views) were stil in need of phenomenological
clarification, by means of which the fundamental insights lying
dormant in their positions could be unlocked and put to proper use. It
is therefore not at al surprising that realists and idealists should both
find themselves confirmed, or, perhaps more significantly,
contradicted in Husserl’s writings. 
That said, the accusation of idealism has always been more cuting
and more damning than that of realism. Being caled a “realist” just
does not sound like much of an insult – this was true at Husserl’s time,
and it remains true today. This is no trivial point. Husserl insisted on
1 Unless I give the translation in the bibliography, the English translations of the German
texts referred to in this article are mine.
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his idealism largely against realist common sense, which paradoxicaly
had been, at least in part, responsible for the success of his “realist”
Logical Investigations. However, when the Logical Investigations were
first published, philosophical discourse was stil mostly entangled in
diferent (even opposing) views that al could be considered
“psychologistic” in the sense that they advocated either a priori mental
or empirical psychological foundations for logic and the other
sciences. By the time Ideas I was published, the landscape had shifted.
Husserl increasingly saw the general atitude of “objectivism”, or
“naturalism”, as his main target, as it was rapidly and relentlessly
gaining momentum in al areas of life. More specificaly, his
“transcendental idealism” was meant to deny (as Kant’s had done) the
bivalence of the idealism-realism debate, which Husserl dismissed as
stil moving «on the level of naturalism (auf dem natürlichen Boden)»
(HUSSERL 1930, 563). That Husserl’s professed idealism can stil, more
than 100 years after the publication of Ideas I, atract philosophical
interest likely has to do with the fact that today realism reigns more
powerfuly than ever. That the qualification of idealism by the term
“transcendental” has left many unconvinced of its power to eradicate
the problems associated with idealism, likely has to do with this
realism's naturalist bent, which considers transcendental idealism just
as “anti-realist” as idealism simpliciter.
That Husserl claimed the title “transcendental idealism” for his
phenomenology is not at issue, even though he did not wish to have
his phenomenology reduced to simply a new version of idealism. As
he remarked sternly, «transcendental phenomenology is no theory
merely there to provide answers to the historical problem of idealism”
(HUSSERL 1930, 419). Yet, the self-suficiency of phenomenology
notwithstanding, he also insisted that the label “transcendental
idealism” was not just one of expediency (let’s say, to ease-in the
audience, for whom his phenomenology was so radicaly new, with
connections to traditional, more familiar models). It clearly was no
mater of “pedagogy” or “public relations” (and how il chosen the
label would have been for that purpose). 
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Husserl is genuinely convinced that there is an intrinsic relation
between phenomenology and transcendental idealism. In his 1930
epilogue to Ideas I, that is, after 17 years of public objections against his
transcendental idealist position, Husserl insists:
I may not here neglect (…) to declare expressly that I retract
nothing  whatsoever as  regards  transcendental-
phenomenological idealism and that I stil consider, as I did
before, every form of the usual philosophical realism
nonsensical in principle, no less so than that idealism which it
sets itself up against in its argumentations and which it
‘refutes’. (Husserl 1930, 560)
In the Cartesian Meditations (published in French just one year later) he
is even more adamant and even claims that … 
(…) phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism’,
though in a fundamentaly and essentialy new sense. (…) The
proof of this idealism is therefore phenomenology itself. Only
someone who misunderstands either the deepest sense of
intentional method, or that of transcendental reduction,
perhaps both, can atempt to separate phenomenology from
transcendental idealism. (Hua 1, 118 f.)
I take it that it is precisely these kinds of formulations that irk Vitorio
De Palma. Why cal it “transcendental idealism” if one gives it “a
fundamentaly and essentialy new sense”? In particular, why cal it
“transcendental idealism” and hence why pledge alegiance to some
form of Kantianism if the fundamental diferences to Kant’s
transcendental idealism are al too apparent? Both De Palma and
Sophie Loidolt, in their contributions to Metodo (2015, Special Issue
I/1), identify some of these fundamental diferences with great
precision. 
Loidolt sees Husserl’s transcendental idealism first and foremost as
an idealism, which rides on the «radical distinction of the modes of
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being ‘consciousness’ and ‘reality’» (LOIDOLT 2015, 117).2 Although
Loidolt acknowledges that this dualism is «revealed by the
phenomenological reduction» (IBID., 117), she believes that it «can
hardly be traced back to a transcendental argument, but is [instead]
rooted in an ontological insight, viz., rests on ontological arguments»
(IBID., 118 f.). This assessment resonates with a relatively wide-spread
perception, one that is shared also by De Palma, namely that Husserl’s
assertion of the primacy of consciousness over reality is not part of a
“transcendental” register, but in fact betrays «the legacy of Brentano
which Husserl never overcame», ultimately a non-transcendental
idealism that as such is no more than «a residue of psychologism» (DE
PALMA 2015, 42). In this respect, De Palma argues that the
transcendental reduction is in fact dispensable because an eidetic
reduction already does the trick (IBID. 18). 
Such an eidetic reduction by itself already yields the fundamental
diference between the being of consciousness and the being of reality.
I would even add that it also provides an insight into the relation
between these two distinct kinds of being. The being of consciousness,
as Husserl points out in Ideas I and then repeats throughout his
oeuvre, is “absolute”; while the being of reality is “relative”, namely
insofar as it is dependent on consciousness, which intends what is real
and posits it as real. In other words, already an eidetic reduction gives
us what Loidolt, with Uwe Meixner, cals the «supervenience of the
real, in particular of the physical, on consciousness», which she
identifies as what idealism just is (LOIDOLT 2015, 119; cf. MEIXNER 2010,
186). In other words, an eidetic reduction already discloses both the
dependency of the real on consciousness and the irreducibility of both.
One way of addressing the proper function of the transcendental
reduction (or its dispensability) is to ask what it provides that we do
not already get by means of the eidetic reduction. In the first instance,
2 Although I folow Loidolt in the use of the term, one must keep in mind that the term
“reality (Realität)” is ambiguous. First of al, consciousness can be said to have its own
“reality” with its own modalities (possible, actual, necessary); and “reality” in this broad
sense is obviously not reducible to “real” objects in the narrow sense of “objects of
possible sense experience”, but includes al possible objectivities, real or ideal.
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the transcendental reduction enables the confirmation of the eidetic
distinction by phenomenological evidence. True to the phenomenological
method, the distinction between the absolute being of consciousness
and the relative being of reality yielded by an eidetic reflection can,
from the transcendental point of view, serve as no more than an
hypothesis until it is confirmed by concrete phenomenological
investigations.3 This is why Husserl says, in the passage from the
Cartesian Meditations I quoted above, that «the proof of this idealism is
(…) phenomenology itself». Secondly, the transcendental reduction
opens up further transcendental-phenomenological investigations of
both consciousness and reality as wel as of the relation between the
two. In the course of these investigations, Husserl finds evidence that
demands an important qualification of the supervenience claim. This
evidence shows that the relation of supervenience does not entail that
the being of consciousness «totaly determines (volständig festlegt)» the
being of reality (which would result in a strong version of
supervenience, cf. MEIXNER 2010, 188; cited by LOIDOLT 2015, 110, fn.
24), even though no objectivity is thinkable and, what’s more, no
objectivity can be independently of consciousness.4 This is a point
worth dweling on.
The irreducibility thesis (i.e., the thesis that consciousness and reality
refer to two irreducibly diferent modes of being) gains strength in its
support of Husserl’s anti-phenomenalism, as it receives confirmation
from the noematic investigations begun in Ideas I. These investigations
show that reality is not dissolvable into contents of consciousness, or
reducible to mental or psychical contents, for the simple reason that a
material thing «is intrinsicaly not an experience but instead a totaly
diferent kind of being» (Hua 3/1, 71). As Husserl’s later genetic and
3 In fact, its apodicticity requires yet another step, namely an “apodictic critique” enabled
by an “apodictic reduction” like the one Husserl advances in his 1922/23 “Introduction
to Philosophy” lecture course. Cf. Hua 35, esp. part 4. This means that even the
transcendental idealist position is initialy a hypothesis. This, by the way, is also true of
Kant’s transcendental idealism, only that Kant and Husserl seek to confirm this
hypothesis by very different means (cf. Jansen 2014).
4 Husserl does not make here a claim concerning the subjective limits of conceivability, but
the ontological claim that there can be no objectivities independently of consciousness.
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generative investigations demonstrate, this irreducibility cannot be
understood as a linear emergence, in which al objectivities could be
“traced back to” and are ultimately “determined” by subjective acts.
Thus, these findings link up with a phenomenological clarification of
the dependency thesis (i.e., the thesis that reality depends on
consciousness). Husserl’s research confirms that objectivities depend
on subjective acts, but also that they do so only in a very specific sense.
Only subjective acts can “constitute” objectivities as objective, and
objectivities can only show themselves as objective to consciousness.5 
Consciousness does not depend on objectivities in this regard; it can
show itself to itself: «no real being, no being which is presented and
legitimated in consciousness by appearances, (…)is necessary to the
being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the stream of mental
processes)» (Hua 3/1, 92)6. There is such a thing as reflective self-
awareness, which constitutes immediate (though, substantialy, by and
large neither apodictic nor adequate) evidence of the being of
consciousness itself – even in the case in which the acts of
consciousness fail to achieve the concordant unity “world” (i.e., even if
the “world” is annihilated, as Husserl’s notorious thought experiment
in § 49 of Ideas I is meant to demonstrate). In this sense, then,
consciousness is absolute (i.e., non-relative), both epistemologicaly and
ontologicaly. However, the independence of consciousness from reality
qua objectivity does not make consciousness strictly self-suficient; nor
is reality epistemologicaly or ontologicaly redundant. When Husserl
claims that «object, objective being, and consciousness belong a priori
inseparably together» (Hua 36, 73), this does not mean that
objectivities are mere “correlates” of consciousness (a claim that can
easily be interpreted in an anti-realist, subjectivist fashion). Rather, as
Husserl states very clearly, for example, in his writings on
5 This requires not only a possible consciousness, but an actual consciousness (cf. Hua 36;
cf. Mele 2010).
6 The point is not that, in order to show itself, consciousness does not depend on any
objectivity that is “real” (in the narrow sense of not being fictional), but that it does not
depend on any real objectivity (in the wide sense of being an object of possible sense
experience).
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intersubjectivity,
(…) the concrete Ego (Ich) has in its life as life of consciousness
(Bewusstseinsleben) always a core of hyle, of non-Ego, but
essentialy belonging to the Ego. Without a realm of
pregivennesses (Vorgegebenheiten), a realm of constituted
unities, constituted as non-Ego (nicht-Ich), no Ego is possible
(Hua 14, 379).
As this quote makes clear, hyle is specificaly not meant in an empiricist
sense, as an immanent object of introspection, but – and here we find yet
another insight gained by the transcendental reduction – as an inseparable,
by itself non-intentional moment of the intentional sense experience in
virtue of which an object may be intended (cf. JANSEN 2014, 82).7 As
Michel Henry, who is known to be in many ways critical of Husserl,
and of his treatment of hyle in particular so aptly put it: for Husserl
hyle is a moment of the «totality of noetic processes in which it is
included» (HENRY 2008, 9). It is not “mere” mater, which would
receive apprehension by the subject only secondarily8, but «it is the
mater of the act that informs it, a mater for this act» (HENRY 2008, 10;
original emphasis). As such, it is immanent and by itself non-
intentional, i.e., “subjective”, and at the same time, as the quote above
from the intersubjectivity writings specifies, also not of the “subject”.
What might appear contradictory in the constitutive analyses of Ideas I
is further clarified in Husserl’s genetic account where Husserl enters
into the depths of the very emergence of content, which is originarily
7 Mark Rowlands also has recently pointed out how empiricist assumptions that reduce
consciousness to (the phenomenal content) of mental states, which are themselves
construed as objects of introspection or thought, make it impossible to conceive of
consciousness in terms of mental acts (and their moments) that are themselves not
accessible as objects, but in virtue of which we can access any objects at al. However,
Rowlands does not consider the ways in which, correlatively, objectivities also condition
(“aford” or “ilicit”) the acts. His analysis thus only addresses the, to speak with
Husserl, “noetic” side of this complex dynamic (cf. ROWLANDS forthcoming, 20-27). 
8 This is why Husserl gives up, or at least fundamentaly revises his mater-apprehension-
schema (cf. Hua 23, text 8 [1909], 265-269; JANSEN 2005, 125; HOLENSTEIN 1972, 86-117).
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correlational. By describing the phenomenon of “original”, or “primary
association” (Hua 11, 151, 273), as part of his expressis verbis
“transcendental” account (Hua 1, 114), Husserl arrives at an
identification of the correlation “afection – afecting non-Ego” as the
concrete phenomenological clarification of the formal “primal
impression (Ur-impression)” (cf. JANSEN 2015, 66-69). The «associative
‘Urstiftung’… plays out as the dynamic back-and-forth of the object’s
‘afective force (afective Kraft)’ and the ego’s ‘responsivity (antwortende
Tätigkeit)’ (Hua 11, 50)» (JANSEN 2015, 68). Consequently, as Rudolf
Bernet has summarized it: «There is no original phenomenon without
something objective that gives itself and without a dative of this
givenness» (BERNET 2015, 117).9 
Thus, the transcendental reduction is indispensable in at least three
diferent ways: First, it delivers the phenomenological confirmation of
the validity of the eidetic insight that the being of consciousness and
the being of reality are fundamentaly diferent. Second, the
transcendental reduction opens up further transcendental-
phenomenological investigations of both consciousness and being as
wel as of the relation between the two. These, in turn, lead to
important qualifications of both the irreducibility thesis and the
dependence thesis, which can be won by means of the eidetic
reduction alone. Third, the transcendental reduction enables a
“transcendental stance” (cf. JANSEN 2014), which considers moments of
consciousness as that in virtue of which objects may be intended, and
not as themselves objects apprehended in introspection. 
I agree with De Palma and Loidolt that it is important not to cover
over the distinct and crucial diferences between important aspects,
emphases, and even the fundamental trajectories of the Husserlian and
the Kantian accounts. To add to their very helpful distinctions, I would
9 This also means that similarity (besides contrast, fusion, prominence, etc., one basic
mode of association) indeed alows “for a transcendental interpretation”, although it
cannot, as De Palma rightly observes, be reduced to subjectivity. According to Husserl,
similarity is not reducible to a subject that recognizes two items as similar according to a
tertium comparationis, but as a manifest quality it stil depends on consciousness to show
itself.
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also say that Husserl’s analyses, unlike Kant’s linear “top down”
deduction, atempt a complex account of what Husserl recognizes as a
complex nexus of moments, dimensions, interdependencies, and
feedback loops, in which rigid bivalence is suspended and in which
instead relational terms (“subjective”/“objective”, noetic/noematic,
active/passive, ideal/real, etc.) are required. Here, Loidolt’s (2015)
emphasis on Husserl’s “transcendental idealism” has the distinct
advantage of reminding us that this idealism is, unlike Kant’s
“transcendental idealism”, irreducible to a consequence of a
“transcendental stance”. For Husserl’s idealism contains not only the
eidetic distinction between “consciousness” and “reality”, but also his
insistence on a dimension of ideality that permeates al layers of reality
(in the broad sense of the word), which is thus modalized into its
actualities, possibilities, and necessities.
However, I see no reason not to recognize Husserl’s own use of the
“transcendental stance” as an overturning (Umwälzung), or
radicalization of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (cf. HEINÄMAA,
HARTIMO, MIETTINEN 2014, 8), whose radicality surely would be lost if
we simply caled it by another name. What’s more, the insistence on
too rigid a notion of transcendental philosophy strikes me as not wel
in tune with Husserl’s own approach to the history of philosophy. For
his notion of Besinnung, performatively demonstrated in the Crisis,
seems to me to be advocating a much more open atitude that
identifies, from one’s own explicit historical and cultural standpoint,
salient philosophical “motifs” to clarify and enrich one’s own account.
That’s why Husserl not only permits, but encourages us to …
(…) use the word ‘transcendental’ in the broadest sense for the
motif (…) of inquiring back into the ultimate source of al the
formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower’s reflecting
(Besinnung) upon himself and his knowing life (Hua 6, § 26,
97 f.).
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